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Abstract 
 
Recent research has highlighted the notion that people can make judgments 
and choices by means of two systems that are labeled here tacit (or intuitive) and 
deliberate (or analytic).  Whereas most decisions typically involve both systems, this 
chapter examines the conditions under which each system is liable to be more 
effective.  This aims to illuminate the age-old issue of whether and when people 
should trust “intuition” or “analysis.”  To do this, a framework is presented to 
understand how the tacit and deliberate systems work in tandem.  Distinctions are also 
made between the types of information typically used by both systems as well as the 
characteristics of environments that facilitate or hinder accurate learning by the tacit 
system.  Next, several e xperiments that have contrasted “intuitive” and “analytic” 
modes on the same tasks are reviewed. Together, the theoretical framework and 
experimental evidence leads to specifying the trade-off that characterizes their relative 
effectiveness. Tacit system responses can be subject to biases.  In making deliberate 
system responses, however, people might not be aware of the “correct rule” to deal 
with the task they are facing and/or make errors in executing it.  Whether tacit or 
deliberate responses are more valid in particular circumstances requires assessing this 
trade-off. In this, the probability of making errors in deliberate thought is postulated 
to be a function of the analytical complexity of the task as perceived by the person.  
Thus the trade-off is one of bias (in implicit responses) versus analytical complexity 
(when tasks are handled in deliberate mode). Finally, it is noted that whereas much 
attention has been paid in the past to helping people make decisions in deliberate 
mode, efforts should also be directed toward improving ability to make decisions in 
tacit mode since the effectiveness of decisions clearly depends on both.  This 
therefore represents an important frontier for research. 
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    The idea that judgments and choices involve distinctive analytic and intuitive 
components resonates with most people’s everyday experiences.  It is also an idea that 
has been discussed by philosophers and scientists across at least two millennia.  More 
recently, the distinctive nature of intuitive and analytic thought has been the subject of 
much psychological research with many theorists postulating so-called “dual models” 
of thought (see, e.g., Bruner, 1986; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994; 
Hammond, 1996; Sloman, 1996). 
    Accepting this dichotomy, a natural question is whether and when one form of 
thinking is more “valid” (however defined) than the other.  At one extreme, it is 
tempting to think that analytic ways of making decisions must be better.  After all, a 
large part of the educational process involves teaching people to think more 
analytically under the assumption that people’s untrained intuitive processes will lead 
them astray.  On the other hand, there is a mass of anecdotal evidence that supports 
the use of intuition (as well as much that does not!) and the term intuition itself is 
often accorded a mystical status akin to truth. Moreover, people sometimes find 
themselves in situations where their analysis contradicts their intuitions. What should 
they do?   
    The purpose of this chapter is to illuminate the issue of when and where 
analytic or intuitive judgment is likely to be more effective. To achieve this, I first 
discuss some of the dual-process models of thought advanced in the literature.   This, 
in turn, leads to my own definition of the dual models that I refer to as the tacit and 
deliberate systems of thought and which I use to make operational the concepts of 
intuition and analysis. I further present a framework for understanding how these two 
systems work in tandem.  Critical to this framework is the notion that stimuli 
encountered by the organism are first filtered by a preconscious processor and that 
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much cognitive activity takes place outside of cognitive awareness. The tacit system 
is thus always involved in making judgments and choices but can be subject to control 
by the deliberate system.  I also emphasize the importance of the state of the organism 
when it first meets any triggering stimulus and that the kinds of information processed 
by the tacit and deliberate systems differ. The former tends to operate on information 
that is partial (relative to the task at hand) but also holistic. The latter operates on 
unitary cues and also depends heavily on additional information that is absent from 
the stimulus that initially triggered the process of deliberate thought. 
    I further stress the role of learning in the acquisition of tacit system responses 
and point out that the nature of the environment in which learning takes place has a 
huge effect on the subsequent quality of tacit responses.  In  kind learning 
environments, people receive accurate and timely feedback that allows the tacit 
system to shape accurate responses. In  wicked learning environments, feedback is 
lacking or misleading and people can learn to have confidence in responses that are 
quite inaccurate. 
    To treat the issue of when and where tacit or deliberative responses are more 
accurate or valid, I first make a number of general comments about the relative 
validities of both systems prior to reviewing a number of experimental studies. As I 
point out, despite the fact that few studies have actually pitted the two systems against 
each other, there is still quite a lot of relevant evidence.   Next, I elaborate on the 
trade-off that underlies this issue.  Tacit system responses can be subject to biases.  In 
making deliberate system responses, however, people might not be aware of the 
“correct rule” to deal with the task they are facing and/or make errors in executing it.  
Whether tacit or deliberate responses are more valid in particular circumstances 
requires assessing this trade-off.  I therefore present a framework that illustrates the 
implications of the trade-off. Critical to this framework is that the p robability of 
making errors in deliberate thought is postulated to be a function of the analytical 
complexity of the task as perceived by the person.  Thus the trade-off is one of bias 
(in implicit responses) versus analytical complexity (when tasks are handled in 
deliberate mode). 
     Finally, I conclude by noting that the important issue is not necessarily to 
decide whether tacit or deliberate processes are more valid than the other.  The 
important task is to make valid responses and, in these, both systems are typically 
implicated.  I also argue that whereas much has been done to help people develop   5
their analytical abilities (and correctly so), little has been done to train people in the 
use and development of intuition.  I believe that the payoff from understanding the 
relative strengths of analysis and intuition lies in identifying ways in which the latter 
can be educated (cf. Hogarth, 2001).   
 
Dual-process theories   
Although grounded in quite different psychological research traditions, the 
work of Seymour Epstein (1994) and Kenneth Hammond (1996) nicely illustrate the 
distinctions between intuitive and analytic thinking that characterize modern 
treatments of this topic.  Epstein has developed a cognitive-experiential self-theory of 
personality that specifies two ways in which people process information. He calls one 
mode the experiential, the other the rational.  The experiential system is automatic 
and driven by emotions and intuition (which he does not define explicitly).  It  
is assumed to have a very long evolutionary history and to operate in non-
human as well as human animals……it is a crude system that automatically, 
rapidly, effortlessly, and efficiently processes information….Although it 
represents events primarily concretely and imagistically, i t is capable of 
generalization and abstraction through the use of prototypes, metaphors, 
scripts, and narratives (Epstein, 1994, p. 715).   
As to the rational system, it is 
a deliberative, effortful, abstract system that operates primarily in the medium 
of language and has a very brief evolutionary history. It is capable of very high 
levels of abstraction and long-term delay of gratification (Epstein, 1994, p. 
715).   
Some of Epstein’s tests of his dual-processes model have been inspired by the 
work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman on judgmental “heuristics and biases” 
or the class of simple-to-use strategies that people rely on to make many everyday 
judgments in the face of uncertainty (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).  For 
example, in one set of experiments, subjects are presented with imaginary scenarios 
and are asked to indicate (1) how most people would react to the situations in the real 
world, (2) how they themselves would react, and (3) how a rational person would 
react (Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992). In one scenario (inspired by Tversky 
and Kahneman), two women arrive at an airport each a half hour late for a scheduled 
flight. One of the women learns that her flight left on time; the other is told that her   6
flight was delayed and has just left.  Who would be more annoyed?  Subjects’ 
responses indicated that, in the real world, the second woman would be more annoyed 
as they would themselves in the same situation. However from a rational viewpoint, 
they acknowledged that there should be no difference in reactions because both 
women missed their flights.  According to Epstein, this pattern of results indicates that 
people clearly recognize that they can reason according to different modes of thought 
and that these two modes can lead to different answers. 
In further experiments, Epstein and his colleagues have investigated how 
people react differently to gambles that highlight the differences between probabilities 
and frequencies (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994).  The 
paradigm involves winning a prize if a red jelly bean is drawn at random out of a jar 
containing 10% red and 90% white jelly beans. The choice faced by subjects is 
whether the draw is to be made from a jar containing 10 or 100 jelly beans.  When 
asked to make this choice for hypothetical situations, people are typically indifferent 
between the two jars.  However, when faced with real choices, people tend to choose 
the jar containing 100 jelly beans.  Once again, Epstein interprets this choice pattern 
as reflecting two systems of thought. In the hypothetical situation, people are 
triggered to reason analytically.  They are indifferent because the probabilities are the 
same in both jars. In the real situation, however, a more primitive form of reasoning 
takes over whereby people react to the greater frequency of  potentially winning jelly 
beans in one jar as opposed to the other (i.e., there are 10 ways to win and not just 
one!). 
It is important to stress that Epstein does not claim that people reason in only 
experiential or rational mode. Instead, both are involved in much of our cognitive 
activity.  Typically, however, he claims that reasoning starts with the experiential 
mode and can then be modified by the rational.  I shall return to this point explicitly 
below.   
Compared to Epstein’s model, Kenneth Hammond’s work makes a clearer 
distinction between the concepts of intuition and analysis.  In particular, he defines 
intuition by contrasting it with analysis or logical thought.  He states, 
The ordinary meaning of intuition signifies the opposite – a cognitive process 
that somehow produces an answer, solution, or idea without the use of a 
conscious, logically defensible step-by-step process (Hammond, 1996, p. 60).   7
Thus, the key distinction made by Hammond is between a process that can be 
made explicit (analysis) and one that cannot (intuition). Note, however, that the fact 
that one process can be made explicit whereas the other cannot does not mean that 
one is more accurate or valid than the other. Errors can arise in both systems and, 
indeed, Hammond argues that the types of errors produced by intuition and analysis 
tend to be different.  In analysis, errors can be quite spectacular.  Consider, for 
example, using analysis to make mathematical calculations.  A small error, such as a 
misplaced decimal place point, can lead to a huge error in the final result.
1   
Intuition, according to Hammond, involves the tacit aggregation of different 
informational cues and, as a consequence, rarely results in responses that are precisely 
correct.  On the other hand, in the absence of systematic bias, errors are not likely to 
be large. (For some experimental evidence on this point, see Peters, Hammond, & 
Summers, 1974). Indeed, Hammond’s distinction between intuition and analysis was 
heavily influenced by Egon Brunswik’s work on perception (1956) and the distinction 
that Brunswik made between the  covert  process of perception that depends on 
integrating and balancing many different correlated cues (“vicarious functioning”) 
and the explicit world of analytic or logical thought. 
Like Epstein, Hammond does not claim that people reason only in a 
dichotomous way, i.e., either intuitively or analytically.  Instead, he argues that 
people’s cognitive activity can be described across a range  of styles that “can be 
ordered in relation to one another on a continuum that is identified by intuitive 
cognition at one pole and analytical cognition at the other” (Hammond, 1996, p. 147). 
In other words, people can exhibit a range of cognitive processes that mix different 
levels or inputs of intuition and analysis.  He labels this intermediate form of 
cognition  quasi  rationality and claims that most judgments involve compromises 
between different modes of thought as well as between different sources of 
information.   
In an important development, Hammond further argues that the particular 
mode of cognition that people use is heavily influenced by the kind of tasks that they 
face.  Thus, in the same way that people’s modes of cognition can be arranged on a 
continuum from intuitive to analytic, tasks can also be arranged on a continuum that 
reflects the extent to which they are likely to induce intuitive thought, at one extreme, 
to analytic thought, at the other. Moreover, he goes on to argue that people’s 
judgments will tend to be more valid when there is a match between properties of the   8
task and the mode of thought employed.  And indeed, in an important study involving 
experienced highway engineers whose task involved judging the safety of highways, 
Hammond and his collaborators provided evidence in support of this proposition 
(Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987).      
This concept of dual systems of thought has, as indicated above, become quite 
popular in different subdisciplines of psychology.  Moreover, the essential feature that 
seems to distinguish the two systems is that of automaticity.  One system requires 
effort, the other does not. Indeed, in the 1970s much interest was raised by work that 
emphasized how many basic psychological processes seem to be automated – from 
the acquisition of motor skills (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977) to the uncanny human ability to record and store the frequencies of events that 
we encounter in the environment (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; 1984). But by the 1990’s, 
social psychologist John Bargh was able to point out that these phenomena are far 
more prevalent than had been previously imagined. He stated, 
It was one thing for reading or driving or detecting digits to be automatic and 
autonomous, able to operate without our conscious control, as the early 
automaticity research had shown. But it was another thing entirely when our 
understandings and judgments of ourselves and others were found to be not 
fully intentional or under our control…….. 
……..by now there are very few research phenomena in social psychology that 
have not been shown to occur at least partly automatically.  A person’s 
affective reactions to another individual are often immediate and unconscious: 
Attitudes toward social and nonsocial objects alike become active without 
conscious reflection or purpose within a quarter of a second after encountering 
the object……..And the emotional content of facial expressions is picked up 
outside conscious awareness and intent to influence perceptions of the target 
individual… (Bargh, 1996, p. 169) 
More recently, Wilson, Lindsey, and Schooler (2000) have published a two-
system theory of attitudes in which they claim that people hold attitudes at two levels, 
one that is implicit, and the other explicit.   Thus much of the literature that 
demonstrates lack of reliability in different measures of attitudes may, in fact, only 
reflect measurements of the different systems.  Similarly, Kahneman and Frederick 
(2002) have revisited the topic of judgmental heuristics and biases from a 2- systems   9
perspective (see also Stanovich & West, 1998).  And Haidt (2001) has analyzed moral 
judgments from both rational and “social intuitionist” perspectives. Finally, an 
exciting new field of research links findings from neuroscience with social 
psychology and also explicitly posits the existence of an automatic intuitive system of 
thought (Lieberman, 2000; Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001). 
 
Defining intuition.   
In an earlier summary (Hogarth, 2001), I have taken the view that, although 
the human organism can be characterized by many information-processing systems, it 
is helpful to consider it as having two systems for learning and doing (where the latter 
includes “thinking”).  I have labeled these systems the tacit and the deliberate largely 
because the latter requires conscious effort whereas the former does not.  Moreover, 
making an analogy with an iceberg, tacit thought is the part that lies below the surface 
(of consciousness) and to which we have quite limited access; deliberate thought, on 
the other hand, lies above the surface and can be made explicit.  Also in keeping with 
this analogy, there is much more activity below the surface than above it. 
………………………………………………. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
………………….…………………………… 
In Figure 1, I have listed a number of characteristics of the tacit and deliberate 
systems.  As noted, the essential difference is one of cognitive effort.  The tacit 
system is triggered effortlessly by stimuli that we encounter in the environment 
whereas deliberate thought is controlled.  It should be noted that Figure 1 does not 
explicitly mention whether thought involves emotion or affect, dimensions that are 
often discussed in relation to intuition. The reason is that emotion or affect are 
typically triggered automatically by specific stimuli and, as such, are tacit system 
responses.   
A further point concerns the extent to which tacit and deliberate actions 
involve learning or reflect response tendencies that are inherent.  I take the position 
that some tacit response tendencies are inherent or at least “more inherent” than others 
(see e.g., Seligman, 1970 on preparedness) but that many (if not most) are learned.  In 
many cases, responses that are initially learned through the deliberate system 
subsequently become automated and thus move from the deliberate to the tacit 
system.  This is certainly true of many motor skills and I believe that most of us   10
underestimate how much it also applies to cognitive skills (see also Hogarth, 2001, 
pp. 78-81).    
Finally, I have so far avoided actually defining intuition.  To do so, I simply 
propose that “the essence of intuition or intuitive responses is that they are reached 
with little apparent effort, and typically without conscious awareness. They involve 
little or no conscious deliberation” (Hogarth, 2001, p. 14, emphasis in original).  
Intuitive responses are therefore outputs of the tacit system. 
 In the next section of this chapter, I outline a framework for integrating the 
roles played by tacit and deliberate thought.  This framework has been developed to 
highlight how both systems work in tandem and to stress differences in how they 
operate.  As will be seen, this – in turn – makes it easier to think about when intuitive 
or analytic thought will be more appropriate and also what can be done to improve the 
quality of intuitive thought.  Of course, in many activities, it is difficult to separate the 
contributions of intuitive and deliberate thought and thus the presentation necessarily 
involves several simplifications.   
 
A framework for integrating the two systems of thought. 
 Figure 2 illustrates the interconnections between the tacit and deliberate 
systems (see also Hogarth, 2001, Chapter 6).  In this diagram, boxes with heavy lines 
indicate the deliberate system; boxes with dotted lines indicate functions of the tacit 
system. Actions and outcomes, the two right-hand boxes (numbers 5 and 6) denote 
events that can be observed in the environment by (in principle) both the organism 
and third parties. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
The diagram illustrates how the tacit and deliberate systems interact in the 
processing of a stimulus (shown on the left of the diagram). The stimulus can take 
several forms: it can be external to the organism, i.e., something that is seen, heard, or 
felt; it can also be internal; for example a thought may trigger other thoughts, and so 
on.   A key assumption is that all stimuli are first processed preconsciously (by the 
preconscious screen – box 1). To facilitate the exposition, I consider what happens in 
three types of cases.       11
In the first case, information about stimuli are recorded without conscious 
awareness and stored for possible future use. This very basic process is at the heart of 
tacit learning and the accumulation of facts and frequencies that has now been so well 
documented in the literature (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; 1984). It requires neither effort 
nor intention and, yet, the information stored can be s ubsequently recalled when 
needed, even for tasks we would have never imagined. Thus, for example, whereas no 
effort is ever made to record how many times we have undertaken a certain action or 
seen something, we are still able to estimate the approximate frequency with relative 
ease and accuracy.   
In the second case, actions appear automatically and bypass consciousness 
such that the person is only aware of an action after it has occurred: i.e., the chain 
from box 1 to box 5 does not involve box 3.  A classic example is the case of 
reactions to fear-inducing stimuli.  For example, you hear a loud noise and find that 
you have already moved to avoid what might have caused it before you realize what it 
is. Alternatively, consider your reactions when driving a motor car or walking along a 
crowded street.  In both cases you take a continuous stream of actions and yet pay 
only a minimum of attention.  An interesting feature of this case is that, especially in 
social situations, our actions precede our understanding of why we have acted in 
particular ways. In other words, we use outcomes to make sense – at a conscious level 
– of what we have just done – at a subconscious level (see, e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999).   
In the third case – of deliberate actions – consciousness plays an important 
role in what we do. People can use the deliberate system to concentrate on stimuli and 
to produce specific actions. Consider, for example, what happens when you read and 
solve an analytical puzzle or make up your mind to do something. Moreover, the 
deliberate system can overrule outputs of the tacit system provided action has not 
already taken place. An example of this is the way we overcome angry feelings. 
(Imagine that another motorist has taken advantage of your courtesy and stolen “your” 
parking space.) Clearly, we can all become angry for a variety of reasons. But this 
does not mean that we “must” act in accordance with the angry thoughts that suddenly 
appear in our consciousness.
2 On the contrary, we can learn – through our deliberate 
systems  – to censor this kind of thought and behavior. (See also Langer, 1989.)  
People can also create intentions in consciousness and decide when and when not to 
let automatic processes take control. As a specific example, consider driving a car.   12
Typically, we decide where we want to go and then delegate many of the functions to 
automatic processing. However, we maintain sufficient attention on the task to be able 
to assume full control if necessary.  
Attention in consciousness is limited and therefore costly. In the framework, I 
assume a scarce resource principle. The key idea is that because the deliberate system 
consumes limited resources, it is used sparingly. It is allocated to tasks that are 
deemed important at given moments but can be switched to other tasks as the situation 
demands. It is rarely “shut down” completely and often has a monitoring function. In 
most cases, the tacit system is our “default” and the deliberate system is invoked 
when either the tacit system cannot solve the problem at hand or the organism is 
making some conscious decision (for example, planning what to do). At any given 
time, however, both the tacit and deliberate will be operating together.   
Discussion of the framework presented in Figure 2 would be incomplete 
without considering the effects of feedback and to understand how this interacts with 
characteristics of the environment. Whereas cognitive processes occur inside the head 
and are unobservable, actions and outputs (boxes 5 and 6) occur, for the most part, in 
the environment and can be observed by both the person and others. Indeed, as noted 
above, the interpretation of automatic actions often takes place after the fact. This is 
indicated in Figure 2 by the arrow that leads from action (box 5) to consciousness or 
working memory (box 3).         
Feedback from the environment occurs because actions (box 5) lead to 
outcomes (box 6). For example, you turn the steering wheel while driving an 
automobile and the car adjusts direction in consequence. For most small actions, 
feedback is immediate and impacts both consciousness (box 3) and long-term 
memory (box 4). However, it is important to note that observed feedback becomes a 
stimulus that is subsequently processed by the preconscious screen (box 1).  Thus, 
whereas i ts effect on working memory (box 3) can be direct (when the person is 
paying specific attention to the feedback), its effect on long-term memory is mediated 
by the preconscious screen.   
Finally, your actions can affect the environment and, in effect, create their 
own feedback.  Thus, the feedback from your own action (box 6) becomes the next 
stimulus to be processed by the preconscious screen (box 1).  For instance, that fact 
that you smiled at an acquaintance, and the smile was reciprocated can affect your 
sense that the person really likes you. However, had you not smiled in the first place,   13
your acquaintance might not have smiled back and your automatic reaction would 
have been to infer less attraction. 
 
Three more factors 
In addition to the framework presented in Figure 2, it is important stress three 
factors that also affect the relative functionality of tacit and deliberate responses. The 
first is that stimuli are not encountered and processed against what might be called a 
“blank slate.”  Indeed, the state of the organism can play an important role when it 
encounters stimuli – I call these “field” or “set” effects.  Second, the nature of the 
triggering stimulus – or task – may favor the use of either tacit or deliberate processes 
(as mentioned above) and this can interact with the demands of the task faced.  And 
third, tacit and deliberate processes differ in the kind of information they typically 
use.  I now consider each of these factors. 
The effects of “field” or “set.”  It is important to recognize that the state of the 
organism at a particular time and location can impact on how it reacts to a triggering 
stimulus.  For example, many studies have shown that a person’s judgments and 
decisions can be affected by his or her physical state when a stimulus is encountered.  
The state of hunger, for example, has been shown to affect the words that people 
recognize from brief exposures (Dember, 1960).  Similarly, variables such as health 
(including mental health), mood (e.g., positive or negative), and stress can all impact 
on how the triggering stimulus is perceived (see, e.g., Hammond, 2000; Isen, 1993).   
  Similarly, perception of the triggering stimulus will be affected by information 
that is accessible – or available – to the person when the stimulus is encountered, 
information that can be either “permanent” or “temporary” in nature.  The source of 
permanent information is the level of knowledge or expertise that the person 
possesses relative to the triggering stimulus. Thus, for example, an expert in a given 
area will perceive a stimulus in that domain quite differently from a novice (see, e.g., 
Chase & Simon, 1973). More generally, a person’s familiarity with the domain will 
affect what knowledge is activated by the triggering event – see also below. 
The  temporary source is simply the information that, for whatever reason, 
happens to be accessible to the person when the stimulus is encountered. The 
importance of such temporary information has been amply demonstrated by the 
extensive use made of priming in  psychological experiments.  Even when people   14
know that recently processed information is irrelevant to their current judgments or 
actions, these can still be affected by such information (see, e.g., Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).  In o ther words, judgments and 
decisions can be affected by information that people have processed in the recent past 
and that is still accessible to them even though they may not be aware of this fact. 
The nature of the triggering stimulus. The extent to which tacit or deliberate 
processes (or both) are activated will be affected by characteristics of the triggering 
stimulus. This notion was introduced and made operational through the concept of a 
task continuum in the paper by Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson (1987) 
discussed above. Conceptually, the task continuum captures the idea that tasks can be 
ordered by their propensity to induce intuitive or analytic thought. In a related vein, I 
have proposed a  visualization hypothesis whereby tasks are more likely to be 
processed in tacit (or intuitive) mode when their context and form promotes visual 
reasoning (Hogarth, 2001).  For example, physics problems presented in visual forms 
(e.g., films, displays) induce more intuitive reasoning than when presented as abstract 
word-problems (see, e.g., Shanon, 1976; Kaiser, Proffitt, & Anderson, 1985; Kaiser, 
Proffitt, & McCloskey, 1985). 
The same stimuli, however, will not necessarily be processed in tacit or 
deliberate manner by all people (see also above). Experts in specific disciplines (e.g., 
medicine, chess) are able to recognize particular stimuli as distinctive patterns (of 
symptoms or chess positions), thereby invoking tacit processes, whereas novices lack 
this ability and are required to process the information in slower, and more deliberate 
fashion (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996).  Relative familiarity or “expertise” with 
particular domains therefore affects the primary mode of thought that people apply to 
specific triggering stimuli.   
A characteristic of tacit thought is that outputs are immediate and automatic. 
Thus, whether the person provides a deliberate response or not, I maintain that a tacit 
response is made to all stimuli whether expressed or not.  In some cases, this tacit 
response may only be a vague feeling; at other times it could be quite precise. Note, 
however, that the tacit response is conditioned by both the nature of the triggering 
event and the state of the organism when this is encountered (i.e., the field or set).   15
Types of cues and information.  When considering the differences between 
tacit and deliberate thought (or intuition and analysis), it is important to recognize that 
the kind of information used in the two modes typically differs on two dimensions.  
First, in tacit thought, information is partial; deliberate thought, on the other hand, 
usually involves additional information, i.e., information that is not present in the 
triggering stimulus.  Second, cues used in tacit thought are  holistic whereas in 
deliberate thought they are unitary.  I now elaborate on these differences.
3  
In most cases, the tacit response will be based on what I call  partial 
information.   The key idea here is that tacit responses do not involve comprehensive 
consideration of all aspects of a judgment or decision but, instead, are sensitive to 
specific features of the triggering stimulus. For example, when someone responds 
intuitively to a stimulus by using the recognition (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) or 
affect heuristics (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002), the response is based 
on only part of the information that could be relevant to the issue at hand.  For 
example, in a task investigated by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002), subjects are 
presented with the names of pairs of cities and asked which in each pair has the 
greater population.  When the name of one city is recognized but the other is not, 
there is a strong tendency to guess that the city recognized has the larger population. 
There is no comprehensive evaluation of all the information that could be brought to 
bear on the problem.
4 Similarly, when a person chooses one garment over another 
because she “likes it more,” there is no pretense that all aspects of the choice have 
been considered.   
In short, tacit processes are driven by information that is partial relative to the 
issue at hand.  Thus the validity of intuitive judgment depends critically on whether 
the partial information accessed is sufficient to make a valid judgment or decision in 
the situation. 
Contrary to tacit responses, deliberate responses typically involve the 
manipulation of information that is not just represented by the triggering event.  For 
example, when deciding which garment to choose  in deliberate mode, the person may 
also think about how other people will like it, for which occasions it will be suitable, 
and so on.  Deliberation may also involve specific manipulation of the information 
presented in the triggering event, e.g., by explicitly deciding to weight some parts of 
the information more heavily than others. In deliberate thought, it is the validity of   16
what might be called additional information that is critical.  In other words, deliberate 
thought typically involves adding/seeking information that is not evoked by the 
triggering event; tacit thought, on the other hand, represents a reaction to a subset of 
the information present in the triggering event.  Both, however, are conditioned on the 
preceding background (field or set).    
As noted above, it is important to emphasize that in many cases the deliberate 
response will be influenced by the tacit response and all that precedes it.  In other 
words, people will always have some tacit response (however minimal) to any 
triggering event.  The issue, of course, is whether – and the extent to which – this 
impacts the deliberate response.  This is, of course, less likely to occur when the 
triggering event presents itself in a format that induces analytic thought and where the 
person both knows and can execute the appropriate formula.   Imagine, for example, 
balancing your checkbook.   
To examine further the distinctions between partial and additional information, 
it is instructive to consider two scenarios.  The first involves estimating your 
purchases at the supermarket; the second is one of the so-called “base rate neglect” 
problems made famous by Kahneman and Tversky (1973).  I start by considering the 
former. 
  Imagine you are at the checkout counter of your local supermarket and have 
just completed your purchase of groceries. To assess what you owe the supermarket, 
you rely on a deliberate process. You let the checkout clerk calculate the amount with 
an adding machine.  As you are preparing to pay, the clerk announces the total of your 
bill, $2,376.53. You are astounded.  In fact, before being told the amount you had 
implicitly estimated that your bill would be around $100 based on your past 
experiences of filling your shopping cart.  Surely, there must be an error? 
This situation illustrates several points. First, although a deliberate process 
was used to estimate the bill, you still made a tacit estimation – probably based on 
your memory for what a typical bill is and how full your shopping cart seemed to be. 
In other words, we don’t seem to be able to suppress the tacit response system.  
Second, in using your tacit system to estimate the bill, your “holistic” estimation was 
based on partial information, namely, you were “primed” for roughly what you 
thought your bill would be (based on past experiences) and you could also assess   17
“how full” your shopping cart was.  Clearly, neither  of these sources of partial 
information was sufficient in these circumstances to calculate the exact bill, but you 
could still use them to make an approximate estimate.  Third, to calculate the correct 
amount, deliberate thought has to use additional information, in this case the rules of 
arithmetic (which, it should be noted, are not part of the triggering event).  Note that 
in this particular case these rules were applied incorrectly (apparently the clerk   
misplaced a decimal in entering some data by hand). However, in these kinds of 
situations we typically accept the validity of this kind of additional information.  
  Now consider a classic illustration of base-rate neglect.  Subjects are presented 
with a short description of Tom W. written by a psychologist when Tom was in his 
senior year at high school.  Among other traits, Tom is described as intelligent, dull, 
and not very sociable. Subjects are then asked to estimate what kind of graduate 
studies Tom is following (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).   Despite recognizing that 
personality descriptions are not perfectly reliable, and knowing something about the 
distribution of graduate students in different areas of study, subjects state that there is 
a good chance that Tom W. is studying subjects such as computer or library science.   
In essence, these judgments reflect the representative (or similarity) heuristic. 
Subjects’ judgments are consistent with their stereotypes of students in different areas 
of graduate studies. They fail to take account of the lack of perfect reliability of the 
description and the distribution of students in different areas of study, i.e., the base 
rates.  
From the viewpoint of this chapter, the tacit or intuitive judgment is based on 
partial information that, in this case, is not sufficient to answer the question correctly.  
In fact, it misleads the subjects.  They fail to consider additional information – about 
base rates – and to use this (in deliberate fashion) to moderate their initial judgments.   
In short, when tacit thought is used, partial information can vary as to whether 
it is an accurate indicator of a criterion (yes, in the supermarket scenario; no, in the 
case of Tom W.).  And when deliberate thought is used, additional information can be 
valid if it is both appropriate and applied correctly (as failed to happen in the 
supermarket scenario).    
Holistic versus unitary cues. Intuitive judgments are often described as being 
“holistic” because they give people the impression that they have considered the   18
stimulus as a “whole.”  This might seem to contradict the discussion above about how 
tacit responses involve partial information.  However, I do not believe there is a 
contradiction.  It is, of course, true that in any given case people may see the “whole 
stimulus” but their tacit reaction is sensitive to only part of it. For example, consider 
the process by which people make judgments by recognition or similarity. These 
processes operate quickly and automatically but are driven by only parts of the actual 
stimuli. Judgments of  similarity between two objects, for example, are heavily 
dependent on features that are common to both objects (see, e.g., Tversky, 1977).  
Recognition works by attending to part but not all of a stimulus (imagine, for 
example, recognizing a friend or relative whom you have not seen for some time).   
It is useful to distinguish between what I call holistic and unitary cues.  To 
explain this distinction, imagine again the problem of estimating your grocery bill at 
the end of your weekly visit to the supermarket.  Using the deliberate response 
system, you could simply sum the cost of all the items purchased. 
But imagine instead, that you estimate your purchases tacitly.  Clearly, this 
would involve looking at part of the information (i.e., partial information) and 
extrapolating from this in some manner.  To do so, however, you could look at either 
unitary or holistic cues.  In the present case, the unitary cues would be the costs of 
each of the items purchased. Thus, for example, you might choose to extrapolate your 
week’s purchases by seeing what you paid for orange juice this week, or perhaps for 
bread.  In other words, since each of these items contributes to the total, each has 
some validity in predicting that total.  With many items, of course, some items would 
be more valid than others for estimating the total and you may even have some feeling 
for this.  
  On the other hand, you could use what I call a holistic cue.  This would not 
involve paying attention to one or, say, two of the unitary cues but, instead, would 
focus on another variable that would give a rough indication of the total amount of 
your purchases. In this case, imagine that the cue you use is “how full” your shopping 
cart seems to be relative to the typical level of your purchases.  Thus assume that this 
week the cart seems a bit fuller (perhaps 10%) than usual. In this case you estimate 
your purchases as being a bit higher than usual, e.g., roughly 1.1 times your typical 
bill.    19
Note the difference between unitary and holistic cues.  The unitary cue stands 
on its own. It is precise and independent of the other cues although it may be 
correlated with them.  It is the kind of cue that would be used as a variable in a 
deliberate or analytic model of the process.  The holistic cue, on the other hand, is 
approximate, and based on an impression of the whole.  It is, however, still partial 
information because it does not take account of all the information in the triggering 
stimulus.  Moreover, it will not provide a precise answer to the question.   
At one level, holistic cues may be thought of as providing patterns that allow 
people to recognize certain stimuli  – and in many cases, this can be true.  For 
example, the stereotypic features of Tom W. (discussed above) can be thought of as 
providing a pattern that people recognize. (See also the description of the famous 
“Linda” in the feminist bank-clerk scenario, Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).  Moreover, 
as elegantly elaborated by Garner (1970), a feature of “good” patterns is that their 
stimulus configurations contain much redundancy such that people do not attribute 
alternative meanings to what they see. Nor are they cued to seek additional 
information to resolve any ambiguity. Thus, it is not hard to understand why people 
exhibit such strong confidence in their intuitions when these are based on recognizing 
“good” patterns.  By these comments, I do not mean to equate the notions of holistic 
cues and patterns but simply to emphasize that holistic cues can be based on such 
patterns. 
The manner in which unitary and holistic cues are processed characterizes the 
distinction between tacit and deliberate thought.  The processing of unitary cues – one 
at a time – and finding a way to aggregate them is the epitome of deliberate thought 
(see also below). In tacit processes, on the other hand, holistic cues are processed 
speedily and without apparent effort.
 
The role of learning 
Above I discussed the importance of feedback and this naturally leads to the 
topic of learning.   The fact that we learn so many things in a tacit manner clearly has 
an important impact on the “quality” of our intuitions (Reber, 1989; 1993).  In 
Hogarth (2001), I develop the notion that tacit learning can take place in environments 
that can be described as  kind  or  wicked.  Kind and wicked environments are 
distinguished by the degree to which people receive accurate feedback on their   20
judgments and actions.  In kind environments, people receive timely and veridical 
feedback; in wicked environments, they do not.  This distinction follows the analysis 
of learning situations originally developed by Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) which 
showed that, even in fairly simple tasks, the feedback people receive on their 
judgments can be distorted by many factors including the very actions that they 
themselves take.  For example, the fact that you take a particular action can prevent 
you form learning about possible outcomes associated with the actions you did not 
take.   
The key point is that the accuracy and timeliness of feedback affects the 
quality of the intuitions we acquire through tacit learning processes.  You cannot learn 
from feedback you do not receive and – as shown by Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) – 
some feedback may simply act to increase confidence in erroneous beliefs.  In short, 
the quality of intuition is highly dependent on whether it was acquired in kind or 
wicked environments.  I shall return to this issue below. 
 
On the relative validities of tacit and deliberate processes 
  For several decades now, there has been much interest in the topic of whether 
people are “good” or “bad” at making judgments and decisions. Moreover, the focus 
of this work has concentrated mainly on what might be called “natural” judgments 
and decisions in situations where people are required to make fairly rapid responses 
and do  not benefit from computational aids.  In some cases, participants in such 
experiments have little experience with the types of questions asked; in others they 
have considerable experience. In addition, several studies have examined decision 
making in quite realistic situations involving experienced participants and even high 
incentives.  Proponents of both the “good” and “bad” viewpoints can point to 
evidence that bolster their positions. 
  Several explanations for good and bad performance have been offered in the 
literature.  Some researchers emphasize the role of individual variables such as 
experience and training in specific types of problems (e.g., Klein, 1998).  Other 
explanations involve the role of incentives (cf. Camerer & Hogarth, 1999), the 
manner in which problems are presented (e.g., the use of frequencies as opposed to 
probabilities, Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995, whether tasks are continuous or discrete, 
e.g., Hogarth 1981, and so on), and even the extent to which people tend to solve   21
problems in an analytic mode as opposed to a more intuitive one (see, e.g., Stanovich 
& West, 1998).  However, once again, it is not to hard find evidence that conflicts 
with all of these explanations. 
  It is tempting to consider this mass of literature within the context of two 
systems that can produce different responses assigning “good” responses to one 
system and “bad” responses to the other.  However, I believe a more fruitful approach 
involves trying to specify the relative advantages and disadvantages of both systems.  
I therefore first specify relative advantages and disadvantages of the two modes of 
thought in general terms.  Second, I discuss some of the empirical evidence that bears 
on the topic of the conditions under which the systems are differentially valid. And 
third, I present a scheme for clarifying these conditions and which can be used for 
future research.  
To motivate discussion of the relative validities of tacit and deliberate thought, 
reconsider the problem described above of estimating your grocery bill at the 
checkout counter. The deliberate process uses unitary cues and can be represented by 
a formula, 
Grocery bill ??????? i xi’s,  i = 1,……k.          (1) 
where the xi’s represent the prices of the k items that you bought (these are the unitary 
cues) and, in this case, the  ?i’s are all equal to 1.  
  Note that what is required in the deliberate approach is to: (1) identify and 
define the variables or unitary cues (in this case, each of the products); (2) define a 
relevant measure for each variable (the prices of the products); and (3) determine a 
rule for aggregating the information from the preceding step.  Clearly, in this case, 
one would simply follow the rules of arithmetic but one could imagine other cases 
involving deliberate thought where you would choose to give different weights to the 
?i’s and/or use another algorithm for aggregating the information, e.g., a 
multiplicative as opposed to additive rule. 
  This example shows both the strengths and weaknesses of the deliberate 
process.  If you define the appropriate variables and measures and use the “right 
formula” correctly, your solution will match the criterion.  However, the success of 
the method depends on executing all of these steps correctly.  Thus, if you are simply 
adding a few figures to calculate, say, the cost of a few purchases, you can probably   22
be confident in the outcome of your deliberation.  However, to the extent that the 
situation is less well defined, the probability of success will be lower.   
Now consider how one might model the tacit process in the checkout counter 
example. As suggested above, this could be described by an anchoring-and-
adjustment model where the person simply adjusts the typical or average weekly bill 
at the supermarket by a variable that expresses “how full” the shopping cart is relative 
to usual, e.g.,  
Tacit estimate of grocery bill    =  ? . z              (2) 
where z represents the typical or average grocery bill and  ? indicates your tacit 
estimate of how full the shopping cart is relative to its usual level.  There are several 
noteworthy features of this process.  First, it is simple to execute (“fast and frugal” in 
the sense described by Gigerenzer, Todd et al., 1999). Second, it uses a variable that is 
likely to be strongly correlated with the criterion, i.e., grocery bills are positively 
correlated with the level of goods in shopping carts. And third, whereas the estimate is 
based on partial information, it does capture characteristics of the “total” problem (as 
noted above). By illustrating a case where a tacit process is likely to be effective, this 
example also emphasizes when tacit responses are likely to be ineffective, namely 
when the stimulus that triggered the response is not – by itself – a good predictor of 
the criterion (see also comments above). 
In thinking about the validity of tacit system responses, we note that  – in 
general terms  – its two most important functions are to classify stimuli into 
appropriate categories (that can imply action or inaction) and to form expectations. 
Moreover, both of these tasks are conducted in environments that are more 
complicated than the organism and thus involve uncertainty.  However, despite such 
uncertainty, the organism learns from feedback (from its own actions or observations) 
and not all actions it takes are irreversible. Two additional points to emphasize are, 
first, that the tacit system  is “old” in evolutionary terms (see also Epstein, 1994, 
above); and second, people’s individual response tendencies have been shaped by the 
particular contingencies encountered in their lives.   
  The fact that the tacit system is old in evolutionary terms implies that it has   
specialized mechanisms for handling important tasks. Moreover, the system is 
sensitive to features of the environment that were important to survival in what is now   23
the distant past.  Today, these features will vary in how suited they are for dealing 
with the demands of modern living.    
  The role of experience (or histories of contingencies encountered) is important 
because the response tendencies of the tacit system are shaped automatically by its 
specific past.  Tacit system responses could involve histories involving many different 
amounts of past experience.  As discussed above, however, the relation between 
confidence (based on amount of past experience) and validity of responses is not 
simple but mediated by the extent to which responses have been acquired in kind or 
wicked environments.  
  Given these characteristics and the uncertainty in the environment, what 
general response tendencies would we expect the tacit system to exhibit?   First, note 
that the organism faces two kinds of errors in problems involving both classification 
and expectation (the relations between variables). Second, in general, the costs of both 
types of errors are not likely to be equal.  In classification, failure to identify a danger 
is probably more costly – in the short run – than failure to identify a benefit (i.e., in 
the extreme failing to identify a predator can entail death; however, failing to identify 
a benefit would not be fatal in the short run). Similarly, when forming expectations, it 
is probably less costly to believe (erroneously) that a relation exists between two 
variables than to fail to recognize a relation that does exist. The point here is that, 
because of the complexity of the environment, discovering valid relations between 
variables can be quite difficult. Thus, falsely believing that a relation is valid will – in 
the short run – be less costly than failing to identify a valid relation (cf. Kareev, 
1995).  
Note that in the cases of both classification and expectation, I have specified 
that we are talking about short-term effects.  The key here is that, when a choice is 
made on the basis of a classification or expectation, there will typically be some 
feedback.  Thus, imagine an organism that takes a speedy fear-induced reaction to 
avoid being attacked by a predator.  If there really is a predator, the action is justified.  
If not, the action taken is not necessarily costly; the organism survives and may even 
have learned something.  Similarly, if an organism acts on a false expectation, it will 
typically receive some feedback; however, it will not receive any feedback if it fails to 
notice a relation between two variables.   24
Of course, it is important to point out that short-term response biases to 
specific classes of stimuli can be costly  if they persist across time. Thus, it is 
dysfunctional to continue making fear-inspired reactions to the same type of stimuli if 
there is nothing to be feared; and continuing to act on false beliefs can have negative 
consequences (consider, for example, the old medical practice of blood-letting).     
As a general consideration, therefore, one should expect tacit systems 
responses to be biased toward conservative responses in choice (i.e., classification) 
and particularly in the case of novel stimuli.  With experience and accurate feedback, 
however, bias in response would be expected to reflect accurately the relative costs of 
the two kinds of errors. Similarly, with novel stimuli, one would also expect 
overestimates of the strengths of expectations (or the relations between variables) but 
that these would become more accurate with feedback (unless this too is biased). 
Finally, note that, in psychology, the concept of validity is typically made 
operational by computing coefficients of correlation between cues  and criteria.  
However, it is important to remember that when used in this way, the correlation 
assumes a squared error loss function and variables that can be measured on, at least, 
interval scales.  This model is not always appropriate. Indeed, the validity of tacit 
responses can often be measured by simple binary categories, e.g., yes/no or go/no-
go, and these categories can be quite broad. For example, in many situations, the 
speed of a tacit response can be important (e.g., when driving a car); in other 
situations, tacit responses are made in circumstances where corrective feedback can 
guide the person to an appropriate decision (e.g., in the process of social interactions 
or even when walking down a crowded street, see Hogarth, 1981). In some cases, 
when tacit responses are accompanied by fear the reaction is simply to take action that 
will avert potential danger. For example, Damasio (1994) argues that sensations 
experienced in the face of risk can help people make better decisions because they 
guide the choice process away from potentially dangerous alternatives (i.e., people’s 
choice set is reduced to less risky alternatives).   
Evidence on the relative validity of tacit and deliberate responses
    
A major problem in assessing the evidence relevant to this question is that few 
studies have been conducted with this issue specifically in mind. Moreover, few 
investigators provide any kinds of controls over whether people respond to problems 
in tacit or deliberate manners. Although studies can be classified in different ways, I   25
believe that eight different kinds of studies are relevant. These involve: (1) 
remarkable cognitive performance; (2) naïve understanding of natural phenomena; (3) 
studies of expertise; (4) clinical judgment; (5) deductive reasoning; (6) probabilistic 
thinking; (7) choice problems; and (8) specific tests of dual modes of thinking. By 
way of illustration, I now provide examples of studies in each of the eight categories.
 
1.  Remarkable cognitive performance.The literature points to many examples 
of what might be called “remarkable” cognitive performance that require little to no 
effort and are thus intuitive. Consider, for instance, the operation of our perceptual 
system. Although it is true that, on occasion, we are subject to illusions, the vast 
majority of our perceptual judgments are accurate or, at least, accurate enough for us 
to navigate the vagaries of everyday life (cf. Brunswik, 1956). Moreover, people seem 
to have some understanding for factors that lead to illusions and can use their 
deliberate systems to correct these as needed. (Consider, for example, adjusting 
estimates of distance to an object according to environmental conditions are bright or 
hazy).   
  Several studies have demonstrated how attention to partial unbiased 
information can result in surprising accuracy of intuitive judgments.  When running to 
catch a ball, for example, athletes appear to rely on an intuitive “gaze” heuristic
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whereby they adjust the speed at which they are running to maintain a constant angle 
with the position of the ball in the air (McLeod & Dienes, 1996). Studies by Ambady 
and Rosenthal (1993) have demonstrated that students’ assessments of teaching ability 
can be fairly accurate when based solely on small samples of behaviors (video clips 
that last a few seconds or minutes).  The notion here is that people can make accurate 
judgments on the basis of such “thin slices of behavior” under two conditions. First, 
these slices are good estimators; and second, people have learned what to look at. For 
example, it is unlikely that students use, say, the color of an instructor’s shoes to 
estimate who will or will not be a good teacher. Instead, they have learned to attend to 
other cues even though they may not be able to make these explicit.    
2.  Naïve understanding of natural phenomena.  There is an intriguing field of  
research that looks at people’s naïve understanding of natural phenomena. Topics 
investigated have included how children acquire the concept that the world is not flat 
(Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992), assessing trajectories of moving objects (Kaiser, 
Proffitt, & McCloskey, 1985), judging where objects will fall when dropped as well   26
as predicting the order in which two objects that vary in weight will reach the ground 
if released simultaneously (Shanon, 1976; McCloskey, 1983).    
  The results of these studies clearly indicate that the manner in which people 
experience phenomena impacts their conceptions. Thus children – like many of our 
ancestors – do not “intuit” that the world is round. Instead, their experience of a flat 
world weighs heavily in their minds and the concept of a spherical world has to be 
integrated cognitively in a slow, deliberate manner.  Similarly, when asked to make 
deliberate responses concerning the trajectories or relative speeds of moving bodies, 
many people give erroneous responses that are consistent with old  – and now 
discredited  – physical  theories (the implication being that, based solely on 
experience, people develop theories that are similar to those of our ancestors). 
Interestingly, however, these responses increase dramatically in accuracy when 
people have had explicit instruction in the underlying physical principles.  Even more 
interesting, however, from our viewpoint is that in some experiments subjects were 
shown films showing different trajectories that moving objects could take and asked 
which were anomalous.  Results indicated that people could recognize which were 
and which were not anomalous trajectories (i.e., using their tacit knowledge) but that 
attempts to answers the same questions by using deliberate reasoning resulted in many 
more errors (Shanon, 1976). 
  Taken together, these studies illustrate the importance of how we perceive and 
experience the world.  In wicked environments (e.g., the seemingly flat world), we 
may acquire erroneous intuitions.  However, in other cases our tacit systems may 
learn to recognize the differences between authentic and artificial stimuli even though 
we cannot articulate differences correctly when reasoning in deliberate manner. 
3.  Studies of expertise.  There have been many studies of expertise (see, e.g., 
Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Ericsson & Smith, 1991; 
Shanteau & Stewart, 1992).  From our perspective, there are several key findings. 
  First, expertise is limited to domains and is only acquired through exposure to 
and activity within specific domains. Thus, because someone is an expert in one 
domain (e.g., chess) does not mean that she will be an expert in another domain (e.g., 
medicine) unless she has also had considerable experience in the latter.   
  Second, outstanding performance in any domain takes years of dedication. 
Moreover, high performers have typically followed demanding regimes of deliberate 
practice and benefited from good teachers.   27
  Third, there is – curiously  – less relation between expertise and predictive 
ability in many areas of activity than one might imagine (Camerer & Johnson, 1991). 
However, this finding may be more indicative of the nature of the uncertain 
environments in which experts operate than due to a lack of “expertise” per se.  
Consider, for example, the random nature of movements of the stock market. 
  Fourth, experts and novices process information in different ways. Experts 
acquire habits that allow them to process more information than novices. They learn, 
for example, how to counteract limitations in short-term memory and to “chunk” 
information more effectively.  They also use different problem-solving strategies.  
Novices tend first to identify a specific goal and then work backward through the 
details to determine a solution – making much use of deliberate thinking.  Experts, on 
the other hand, rely more on tacit processes. They tend first to take in the details of 
the problems they face, and then determine (by recognizing patterns and similarities) 
a general framework that allows them to explore possible solutions. Not surprisingly, 
experts solve problems faster than novices. 
4. Clinical judgment.  There are many tasks involving predictions or 
evaluations where people could also resort to deliberative methods such as simple 
linear models.  Consider, for example, predicting success in graduate school or bank 
loan failures.  The evidence in this area is overwhelming. If you only allow people to 
use the same information that is provided to simple models, models (or deliberative 
processes) predict better than humans (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989).   
There are, I believe, two reasons for this result.  First, models are consistent in 
their application of rules whereas people are not.  Second, in many of the situations 
studied in these tasks people do not receive good feedback. For example, in making a 
credit decision, the outcome may not be known to the lender for some time and/or the 
fact that the lender did or did not make the loan could by itself affect the outcome. 
Interestingly, whereas it is true that models predict more accurately than people in 
almost all of these kinds of situations, it is also the case that the predictive ability of 
models is not high. 
On the other hand, it is also true that there are many areas where unaided 
“clinical” judgment of humans is seen to be effective. This is the case, for example, in 
several situations involving weather forecasting (cf. Murphy & Winkler, 1984), as 
well as in aspects of clinical judgment (Garb, 1998). But again, these are mainly   28
situations where people have received accurate feedback, i.e., learning environments 
have been kind. 
5. Deductive reasoning.  Many studies have examined people’s ability to 
reason in appropriate deductive  fashion when dealing with problems that involve 
testing rules of the form if p then q (Wason, 1966).  Basically, the result is that when 
problems are presented in somewhat abstract form (e.g., involving relations between 
cards), people fail to solve the problem correctly even when trying hard in deliberate 
fashion. However, when problems with the same logical structure are presented in the 
context of situations with which people are familiar, they are able to make appropriate 
responses (Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972). 
Although these results have been given different interpretations, I believe that  
the key issue is that familiar contexts appeal to people’s tacit knowledge and that this 
allows them to access an answer without much effort and, in this case, an answer that 
happens to be correct.  In other words, the abstract form of the problem cannot be 
answered in this way and, because people do not necessarily have the deliberate 
knowledge necessary to solve the problem correctly, they fail to do so when forced to 
rely mainly on their deliberate mode of thought. 
6. Probabilistic thinking. Similar mechanisms can be found in the literature on 
probabilistic reasoning.  Consider again the Tom W. problem discussed above 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).  Here the context of the problem allows people to 
classify Tom in a stereotypic kind of way and to generate a tacit response. However, 
in this case the tacit response is “incorrect.”   
Similarly, several investigators find differences in responses depending on 
whether people are presented with problems in the form of probabilities or 
frequencies. Most people, it seems, can relate to the meaning of frequencies and this 
can lead to more accurate responses (see, e.g., Fiedler, 1988; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 
1995).  On the other hand, frequencies can also trigger responses that would be 
difficult to justify on a normative basis (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Denes-Raj & 
Epstein, 1994).     
7. Choice problems. Two notions underlie some of the most interesting results 
in experimental work on choice over the last decades.  The first is the idea that when 
problems are presented or “framed” in different ways, people change their responses 
in systematic ways (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Thus, people’s natural choices 
simply reflect the manner in which problems have been presented to them.  From our   29
viewpoint, however, it is not clear what conclusions to draw from these studies 
because it is uncertain which intuitive responses should be considered more valid.   
The second idea is that, in making choices, people often seek to avoid making 
explicit trade-offs and thus the manner in which problems are presented to them can 
sometimes suggest – by appealing to tacit knowledge – what choices to take (see, e.g., 
Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993). Explicitly using trade-offs involves a high level 
of deliberate thought; avoiding trade-offs suggest the use of implicit arguments or 
rationales and is heavily dependent on tacit processes.  It is fairly easy to construct 
specific cases where failure to confront trade-offs leads to suboptimal choices and this 
could suggest that deliberation should be preferred to tacit processes. However, we do 
not know enough about the total ecology of people’s choices to be able to make such 
a statement (cf., Hogarth, in preparation).  
8.  Specific tests of dual modes of thinking.  A few studies have explicitly 
tested the relative validity of tacit and deliberate processes.  In one study, Wilson and 
Schooler (1991) investigated the effect of introspection, in the form of providing 
explicit reasons, on the quality of choice. The question posed was whether people are 
better off trusting their initial feelings or taking time to reason deliberately.  
Their paper makes the point that whereas people may have preferences for 
different options, they typically cannot explain why.  That is, many of our preferences 
simply reflect the often-passive interactions we have had with our environments and 
may not be easy to justify, on reflection.  However, in many choice situations, there 
are also salient and plausible reasons that people recognize as being relevant and, if 
they think explicitly about the choice, these reasons are likely to come to mind.  The 
question is whether thinking explicitly about such reasons will change people’s 
preferences for the better. 
In studies involving preferences, it is problematic to establish what is or is not 
“good.”
   Wilson and Schooler studied college students’ preferences for different 
brands of strawberry jam and college courses and, for both types of stimuli, used 
expert opinions as the criterion of “goodness.”  Results showed that, in both studies, 
introspection  – or making reasons explicit  – led to inferior decisions relative to 
control subjects who had not engaged in introspection. According to Wilson a nd 
Schooler, thinking about the choice led the experimental subjects to consider reasons 
that were nonoptimal.  Thus, had they not spent time in thinking, they would have 
responded in similar fashion to the control subjects whose initial preferences were   30
closer to the experts’ opinions.  In a further study, two groups of students evaluated 
several posters and were allowed to choose one to take home. One group was asked to 
introspect explicitly about their evaluations; the other was not. About three weeks 
later, the second group was found to be more satisfied with their choices (Wilson, 
Lisle, Schooler, Hodges, Klaaren & LaFleur, 1993).  
  Although studies such as these have been cited as examples of how intuition 
may be superior to analysis, care should be taken in generalizing. First, what the 
studies show is that deliberation affects and changes expressed preferences if subjects 
are unaware of the origin of those preferences (see also Wilson et al., 1993).  
However, other studies have shown that when people are aware of the origin of their 
initial preferences, these are less likely to be changed by thinking about reasons
  
(Wilson, Kraft, & Dunn, 1989).
 
  Second, decision aids that force people to be explicit about the reasons for 
their decisions have been shown to heighten satisfaction in choices relative to control 
groups that were not provided with aids 
 (Kmett, Arkes, & Jones, 1999).  Similarly, in 
the area of judgmental forecasting several studies have examined the validity of so-
called “decomposition” methods in which people are required to split the prediction 
task into subtasks, make judgments about the parts, and then use a rule to aggregate 
the different judgments.  Results show that decomposition methods are more accurate 
than directly estimating the outcome
  (MacGregor, 2002).  
   Third, McMackin and Slovic (2000) have recently both replicated Wilson 
and Schooler’s results and emphasized the importance of understanding the joint 
effects of types of task and cognition emphasized Hammond (see above). Specifically, 
McMackin and Slovic asked subjects to make judgments in two tasks. One involved 
assessing how much people would like advertisements (an “intuitive” task). The 
second required estimates of uncertain facts such as the length of the Amazon River 
(an “analytical” task). There were two groups of subjects. One was just asked to 
answer the questions; the other was explicitly instructed to provide reasons for their 
answers.  Results showed that, for the intuitive task (advertisements), providing 
reasons h ad a negative effect on performance thereby replicating Wilson and 
Schooler.  On the other hand, generating reasons had a positive effect on performance 
in the uncertain facts task. Thus, McMackin and Slovic also replicated the results of 
Hammond et al. (1987) involving the interaction of type of cognition with type of   31
task, i.e., “intuition” was seen to be more valid in an “intuitive” task and “analysis in 
an “analytic” task.
   
 
  Fourth, there is much evidence that, when requested to verbalize their 
thoughts, people shift to a more deliberate mode of information processing.  What 
needs to be made clearer, however, is whether and when this leads to “better” 
outcomes (Schooler & Dougal, 1999). For example, when subjects engaged in 
problem solving are asked to verbalize their thoughts, there is evidence that this has 
deleterious effects on problems that require “insightful” solutions but not on more 
analytical problems. Verbalization, it seems, forces people to act in deliberate mode 
and cuts off access to tacit processes (Schooler, Ohlsson & Brooks, 1993). And yet, it 
is important in certain types of problem solving for people to access their 
subconscious.  Similarly, recognition memory is highly dependent on the tacit system 
and can be less accurate if people are asked to make explicit use of the deliberate 
system through verbalization (Schooler & Engster-Schooler, 1990). 
Intuition (tacit thought) or analysis (deliberation)? 
  Above, I have discussed the respective strengths and weaknesses of tacit and 
deliberate thought as well as evidence bearing on the issue of relative validity in 
different circumstances.  Tacit thought is based on partial, holistic cues and its 
accuracy depends on the extent to which this information leads to biased responses.
  In 
addition, tacit thought typically involves approximate answers and thus, even when a 
series of tacit responses might be unbiased (in a statistical sense), specific responses 
will typically involve some error. As to deliberate thought, accuracy depends on the 
extent to which the person knows and is able to apply the “correct formula” (using 
unitary cues).  Unlike the errors from tacit responses, errors in deliberate thought tend 
to have an “all or nothing” quality, i.e., there are typically no errors or large ones 
(recall the example of the checkout counter).  
 
To assess whether tacit thought (intuition) or deliberation (analysis) is more or 
less likely to be accurate in a particular situation, it is illuminating to consider the 
trade-off between the bias and error implicit in tacit thought, on one hand, and the 
probability that a person will know and correctly apply the appropriate deliberate 
“formula,” on the other.  
As noted above, there are many cases in which tacit responses are biased but 
where such biases are, in fact, functional (e.g., reactions to potential sources of   32
danger). Ignoring these kinds of cases, bias in tacit judgments and decisions will 
reflect the conditions in which response tendencies have been learned.  Were these 
acquired in kind or wicked learning environments?  Similarly, to what extent is the 
partial information on which tacit responses are based unbiased? 
As to deliberate thought, one should ask what affects the probability that the 
person will know and apply the appropriate “formula” correctly. From the evidence 
reviewed above, two factors are critical.  One is the manner in which the problem is 
presented, i.e., does this invite use of the appropriate formula? (See, e.g., Gigerenzer 
& Hoffrage, 1995.)  The second factor (which may often be related to the first) is the 
complexity of the problem as presented. To summarize both these factors, therefore, I 
assume that the probability that a person will know and apply the appropriate 
deliberate formula correctly is a monotonic function of what I c all the  analytical 
complexity of the task.  In other words, the greater the complexity a task exhibits in 
analytical terms (as measured, for example, by number of variables, types of 
functions, weighting schemes, and so on), the less likely it is that a person will both 
know the appropriate formula and apply it correctly.  (Individuals can, of course, vary 
in the extent to which they perceive tasks as analytically complex.)  
As an example, consider the experiment of McMackin and Slovic (2000) 
described above.  From an analytical viewpoint, it is clearly a difficult task to judge 
whether people will like an advertisement. (Just what are the appropriate variables 
and how should they be measured and combined?)  Thus, we would expect that an 
intuitive judgment b ased, perhaps, on how much the people just liked the 
advertisement themselves would be a more valid response (assuming little or no bias 
in response). Similarly, when asked the length of the Amazon River, it is probable 
that one’s first intuitive response could be biased by different sources of information. 
(What were the last distances in your mind?) Thus, thinking through different explicit 
reasons for one’s answer would not be too difficult analytically and could help   
improve the accuracy of the response. 
……………………………………………………. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
……………………………………………………. 
  Figure 3 explores the trade-off between bias in tacit (intuitive) thought and the 
effects of analytical complexity in deliberate thought (analysis). It shows how the 
differential accuracy of the two modes of thought varies when tasks are characterized   33
by the extent to which they (a) induce different levels of bias in tacit thought and (b) 
are experienced as varying in analytical complexity. To simplify the discussion, I 
have considered three levels of each variable and thus nine types of situation. Bias is 
characterized by labels of “large,” “medium,” and “small/zero;” and analytical 
complexity is said to be “easy,” “moderate,” or “hard.”  For the moment, I ignore 
individual differences (however, see below).    
  Consider cell 1, where bias is large but the level of analytical complexity is 
easy.  Here deliberation is likely to be more accurate than tacit thought.  An example 
is provided by the well-known Müller-Lyer illusion.  A tacit judgment suggests that 
one line is larger than the other; however, the deliberate use of a ruler can demonstrate 
that both lines are the same length.  
However, note that as analytical complexity increases, the differential 
accuracy between the two types of thought is predicted to decrease. In cell 2 – with 
moderate analytical complexity  – deliberation is still preferable to tacit thought. 
(Imagine other optical illusions where people cannot use a simple analytical device 
such as a ruler to resolve uncertainty.)   
In cell 3 – when analytical complexity becomes hard – it is not clear whether 
the errors of deliberate or tacit processes would be greater.  Consider, for example, a 
person making a complicated investment in an area where she lacks prior experience.  
The person could be heavily biased by inappropriate prior experience and also lack 
the analytical ability to make the appropriate deliberate decision.  However, it is not 
clear which error would be greater. 
  The interaction between bias and analytical c omplexity is most clearly 
illustrated in cells 4, 5, and 6 where bias is maintained at a “medium” level.  When 
analytical complexity is easy, deliberate thought should be preferred to tacit.  For 
example, a simple “base rate” task such as the “engineer-lawyer” problem (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1973).  This is not analytically complex (for most people) and even 
approximate use of the correct formula will be more accurate than the prototypical 
tacit response. However, as analytical complexity increases, tacit processes become 
progressively more accurate in a relative sense (cells 5 and 6), i.e., the increasing 
probability of making errors in analysis eventually outweighs the bias and error 
inherent in tacit responses.    34
Finally, consider cells 7, 8, and 9 where the  bias from tacit thought is 
insignificant.  For tasks that are easy in analytical complexity (cell 7), one should 
observe no accuracy differences between deliberate and tacit responses. An example 
might be adding two numbers explicitly (e.g., 2 + 2 = 4) or simply recognizing the 
“pattern” that the sum of two particular numbers makes (e.g., 4 can be “seen” to result 
from 0 and 4, 1 and 3, and 2 and 2). However, for moderate and hard levels of 
analytical complexity (cells 8 and 9), tacit process responses are predicted to be more 
accurate.   
  The purpose of Figure 3 is to provide a framework for considering the 
conditions under which tacit (intuitive) or deliberate (analytic) thought is likely to be 
more valid.  In summary, deliberate thought is predicted to be more accurate than tacit 
thought in cells 1, 2, and 4; intuitive thought is predicted to be more accurate than 
deliberate thought in cells 6, 8, and 9; no differences are predicted in cell 7; 
differences in cell 5 will be small; and no predictions seem possible for cell 3. 
Whereas this framework has not been empirically tested as such, it provides a means 
for classifying and thinking about studies that have been reported in the literature.  
Finally, one aspect not explicitly addressed here is the role of individual differences.  
Clearly people can vary in their susceptibility to bias in tacit thought (depending on 
their learning history), and certainly expertise affects the extent to which people 
perceive tasks as analytically complex.  Thus this framework could also be used to 
predict when and where people with differential experience in specific domains would 
be advised to better trust their “analysis” or their “intuition.” 
 
Toward more valid judgments and decisions 
  As this chapter shows, attempts to define the circumstances under which tacit 
(intuitive) or deliberate (analytic) judgments and decisions are likely to be more 
accurate raise a host of interesting psychological issues.  On the one hand, it is 
necessary to have a holistic view of how tacit and deliberate processes interact; on the 
other hand, one also needs to specify much of the minute details of each system. By 
looking at the operation of both systems in tandem, one is struck by senses of both 
complexity and efficacy.  The human system is complex. But it is also effective at 
handling a wide variety of different cognitive tasks.   35
  And yet, although effective, we know that the human cognitive system is not 
perfect in the sense that people’s judgments and decisions still involve errors that can 
not be attributed merely to random events in the environment.  An important issue, 
therefore, is how to help people achieve their goals by making fewer errors and, 
indeed, a large part of our educational system is dedicated toward this objective.  As 
educators, we spend much time teaching analytic methods designed to help people 
hone their capacity for deliberate thought.  And, it could also be argued that when 
such reasoning is assimilated, people can learn to use some tools of analysis in tacit 
fashion.  However, what is not done is to train people explicitly in how to develop 
their capacity for intuitive thought.   
In Hogarth (2001, Chs. 6, 7, & 8), I provide a framework and many 
suggestions as to how people can develop their intuitive skills.  Central to these ideas 
is the notion that our tacit systems are constantly honing our responses to the feedback 
we receive in the environments in which we operate (recall the discussion above on 
kind and  wicked learning environments).  Thus selecting appropriate learning 
environments and monitoring the kinds of feedback that we receive must rank high on 
the conditions that foster the acquisition of good intuitions.  In addition, I believe that 
people need to be more aware of how often they allow themselves to take decisions 
automatically as opposed to exercising greater cognitive control (as elegantly 
discussed by Langer, 1989).    
Greater awareness of the dual nature of thought can, by itself, lead to better 
use of our limited cognitive resources.   36
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Figure 1  Characteristics of the two modes of thought 
Figure 2  The deliberate and tacit systems. (From Hogarth, 2001, p.196) 
Figure 3  The relative accuracy of tacit and deliberate thought 
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        complexity     
             
      Easy  Moderate  Hard   
             
   Large  1  2  3   
             
      D > T  D > T  ?   
             
Bias and error implied           
by tacit processes  Medium  4  5  6   
             
      D > T  D ~ T  T > D    
             
             
   Small/zero  7  8  9   
             
      D = T  T > D   T > D    
             
             
             
             
 D > T  means deliberate thought more accurate than tacit 
 D ~ T  means deliberate and tacit thought approximately equally accurate 
 D = T  means deliberate and tacit thought equally accurate 



































     
 
   
Footnotes 
   
 
                                                 
1  As an example, consider the space probe recently launched by NASA that failed to 
meet its target because engineers were inconsistent in using the metric and imperial 
systems of measurement. 
2  Clearly the existence of roadrage indicates that not all people do learn to control 
their angry feelings. 
3 At first glance, it might seem contradictory that tacit thought is said to involve 
information that is both partial and holistic. As will be explained, however, there is 
no contradiction.    
4 Whereas the assumption being made here is that a tacit process is largely at work, it 
is also quite possible that some subjects use the “recognition heuristic” in a deliberate 
fashion. (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, do not investigate this issue in their paper.)  
However, it is undoubtedly the case that the act of recognizing one city in a pair (but 
not the other) is a tacit process.  
5 The term “gaze” heuristic is due to Gerd Gigerenzer (2001). 